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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
EUGENE F. ROGERS*
The Supreme Court of South Carolina handed down four-
teen decisions involving substantive and procedural rules of
criminal law during the review period. Out of the fourteen
cases considered, two were reversed. The Court reviewed four
cases where the verdict of the jury made the death penalty
mandatory and one of the four was reversed.
Several of the cases are somewhat unusual. One involves
the injunctive process to enforce laws which are punitive in
nature.
Abatement and Injunctions
In Ez parte Stone" the defendants were operating a place
of business in the city of Chester known as the "Teenage
Canteen" in which alcoholic liquors were allegedly unlawfully
sold. Warrants for the arrest of the defendants had been
issued charging them with the unlawful sale of intoxicating
beverages on two occasions. This action did not have a re-
straining influence on the defendants and they allegedly con-
tinued the unlawful sale of alcoholic liquors. The Chief of
Police of Chester petitioned the court of general sessions
for an order restraining and enjoining the defendants from
selling or giving away any alcoholic liquors and alleged in
his petition that defendants' place of business was "a menace
to the community at large" and "endangered the morals and
well-being of the young people who constantly frequent the
said Teenage Canteen."
Based on this restraining order the defendants were re-
strained and enjoined from selling or giving away any al-
coholic liquors temporarily and were required to show cause
why such restraining order should not be made permanent.
Subsequently the chief of police petitioned the court for
an order adjudging the defendants in contempt of court for
violating the restraining order by selling additional alcoholic
liquors after the court's order had been issued.
When the contempt proceedings were heard the lower court
filed an order holding one defendant in contempt and ordered
*Rogers & McDonald, Columbia, S. C.
1. 236 S. 0. 263, 113 S. E. 2nd 786 (1960).
19
1
Rogers: Criminal Law and Procedure
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
him to pay a fine of $200.00 and be imprisoned for a period
of six (6) months.
From the order adjudging him in contempt, the defendant
appealed, contending that the order was too vague and gen-
eral and that in any event the punishment should have been
imposed under another section of the Code, to-wit Section
15-231.1, rather than section 4-406.
The Supreme Court dismissed the defendant's exceptions
and held that the legislature had the power to declare places
where liquor is sold contrary to the law to be common nui-
sances and had the power to provide for their abatement. The
court ratified the law as laid down in Ex parte Keeler2 where-
in it was held that the procedure to abate nuisafilces such as
this might be summary in nature and the fact that no provi-
sions were made for trial by jury did not render such legisla-
tion unconstitutional. The Court reaffirmed the principle that
the equitable jurisdiction of the court to enjoin a public nui-
sance is not affected by the fact that a criminal prosecution
may also be instituted for the acts which constitute the nui-
sance.
The appellant in the case above, Langley, was also the
appellant in two other cases before the Supreme Court. In
one of the cases, State v. Langley,3 the appellant appealed
from the conviction referred to above for the unlawful sale
of intoxicating liquor. The defendant's appeal was predicated
on the contention that the judge improperly admitted certain
evidence and on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence
to convict.
The Court held that the question of the insufficiency of
the evidence had been properly ruled upon by the lower court
and that the guilt or innocence of the defendant was a ques-
tion for the jury.
Gaming
In the third case, State v. Langley,4 the appellant was con-
victed before a magistrate of permitting a minor, under the
age of 18, to play a pin ball machine. He appealed to the
general sessions court and from there to the South Carolina
Supreme Court. In this appeal, appellant called to his aid
2. 45 S. C. 537, 23 S. E. 865 (1895).
3. 236 S. C. 395, 114 S. E. 2d 506 (1960).
4. 236 S. C. 583, 115 S. E. 2d 368 (1960).
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Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution of South Carolina, and
the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of The United States.
The appellant was convicted of violating Section 5-624.2
of the Supplement to the Code of Laws South Carolina for
1952 which provides, "It shall be unlawful for the operator
of any pinball machine to permit any minor under the age
of 18 to play or operate such machine. The operator of any
pinball machine shall be responsible that every person who
plays or operates his machine is in fact legally authorized
to do so."
The defendant admitted that the operator of the machine
referred to at the time of his arrest was a minor of the age
of 17 and that the machine was in his place of business. The
appellant contended that the act in question prohibited the
carrying on of a legal business. The State contended that the
act in question was a regulation of business under the police
power of the State. The Supreme Court held that the General
Assembly in licensing the operation of such machines had a
right to regulate such operation under its police power for
the public benefit and to require that the operation be con-
ducted in such a way as not to be obnoxious to public health
or morals. The Court held, "the very nature of the machine,
the flashing of the lights, the mounting of the score, and its
operation in general, is conducive to wagering or gaming."
The Court went on to say, "Such police power may be ex-
ercised for the benefit of the public safety, health, peace,
morals, or general welfare .... "
Arrest: Crime Committed in the Presence of the Officer
In State v. Williams5 the defendant was a passenger in an
automobile operated by his brother when the car was stopped
by a highway patrolman. After the defendant dismounted
from the car, the patrolman saw in the vehicle a jar of un-
stamped whiskey and removed it. The driver of the vehicle
was placed under arrest and then an attempt was made to
place Williams under arrest. The defendant resisted, took the
officer's pistol and threw it in a field.
The defendant was subsequently charged with assault with
a deadly weapon and at the trial raised as a defense unlawful
arrest. It was argued that defendant had nothing to do with
the whiskey being in the automobile and therefore he com-
5. 237 S. C. 252, 116 S. E. 2d 858 (1960).
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mitted no offense while in the presence of the patrolman. At
the conclusion of the trial, appellant's counsel asked that the
jury be instructed that an offense is not committed in the
presence of an officer unless his senses afford him knowledge
that the offense is being committed. It would therefore follow
that if the officer did not know at the time of the arrest that
an offense was being committed he would have no authority
to arrest the defendant. The trial judge refused the request
to charge.
The Supreme Court concluded that the request of the ap-
pellant's counsel involved a sound legal principle and said,
quoting the Minnesota decision of State v. Pluth,6
Although a person may actually be committing a criminal
offense, it is not committed in the presence of an officer
within the meaning of the statute, if the officer does not
know it. And where the officer could not observe nor
become cognizant of the act constituting the offense by
the use of his senses it could not be committed in his
presence so as to authorize an arrest without a warrant.
Grand Larceny
In the same case the defendant was charged with robbery
and grand larceny because of his having taken the officer's
pistol. The defendant contended that in order to make out
the offense of larceny there must be a felonious purpose. The
taking must be done animo furandi-with a view of depriving
the true owner of his property and converting it to the use of
the offender. He contended that the taking here was to avoid
an unlawful arrest and that there was no intent to steal.
The Court was apparently genuinely concerned about
whether the evidence warranted an inference of an intent
to steal under the peculiar facts of the case. It reviewed a
number of cases and concluded, "While the question is a close
one, it is our conclusion that the question of felonious intent
should be determined by the jury." It went on to say, "of
course a jury would be fully justified in concluding that there
was no intent to steal the pistol but that the dominant and
primary purpose of appellant was merely to disarm the pa-
trolman, and that shortly after doing so, he discarded the
pistol."
The defendant moved for a directed verdict on the larceny
charge on the ground that there was no proof that the pistol
6. 157 Minn. 145, 195 N. W. 789 (1923).
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was worth $20.00 or more. There was no evidence produced
at the trial as to its value. The Court concluded that the
appellant's contention that the evidence did not support a
conviction of grand larceny should be sustained since there
was no proof of the value of the pistol.
Rape
The Court reviewed four cases involving rape. The death
penalty had been given in three cases and the jury had failed
to convict the defendant of the crime of rape in the other
case, but had returned a verdict of guilty of assault and bat-
tery of a high and aggravated nature.
Charge of the Facts
In State v. Thorne,7 the defendant was convicted of the
rape of a sixteen-year-old girl. One unusual aspect of the case
was that the defendant took the stand and asked that he be
executed for his crime.
In the charge of the presiding judge to the jury the follow-
ing language was used:
Mr. Foreman and Gentlemen, every man the law says has
the right to walk up and down the streets and highways
of our State without fear of being robbed of his money.
And I will tell you frankly that every woman has the
right to walk upon the highways and our streets without
fear of being robbed of something which God alone gives
her and when that is stolen from her she is very poor
indeed. Such an act is not looked upon by the law with
any degree of lightness. The facts are for you. The law
is established in this State as it is written.
The defendant appealed contending that this was an im-
proper expression of opinion on the facts.
The Court concluded that this was an improper expression
of opinion prohibited by Article 5, Section 26 of the Constitu-
tion of the State of South Carolina which provides, "Judges
shall not charge juries in respect to matters of fact, but shall
declare the law."
The Court went on to say:
Proper evaluation of the erroneous portion of the charge
requires that we view it in the light of the circumstances
and it is impossible to say just what effect this portion
7. 237 S. C. 248, 116 S. E. 2d 854 (1960).
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of the instruction, coming so late in the charge, had
upon the jury, but it must be assumed that it was not
disregarded.
Being Held in Custody for Unreasonable Length of
Time Prior to Being Charged with Rape
In State v. Outens the defendant was prosecuted for and
convicted of rape. Numerous exceptions were raised, among
them one that the defendant had been held in custody for
an unreasonable time prior to being charged with rape. The
Court dismissed the exception because review of the appeal
record failed to show that the question was raised upon the
trial of the case. The Court said:
If the appellant conceived that any prejudice had re-
sulted to him by reason of his detention without being
formally charged with the crime of rape before a mag-
istrate, this question should have been raised by proper
objection or motion during the trial. We have held that
where a party has the option to object or not as he sees
fit, the failure to exercise the option when the oppor-
tunity therefor presents itself must, in fairness to the
Court and to the adverse party, be held either to con-
stitute a waiver of the right to object, or to raise an
estoppel against the subsequent exercise thereof.
Evidence of Reputation
The defendant also objected to the refusal of the trial judge
to permit a witness to answer the following question about
the defendant. "Q. From your knowledge, and from the rep-
utation he had, do you think he was a kind of person to get
into this kind of difficulty?"
The solicitor interposed an objection to this question and
the lower court sustained it. The Supreme Court sustained
the lower court: "It was proper for the witness to testify
to the general reputation of the appellant but he could not
express an opinion as to whether he was guilty of the crime
with which he was charged."
Admissibility of Photographs
If State v. Johnson9 the defendant was convicted of assault
with intent to ravish and appealed on the ground, principally,
8. 237 S. C. 514, 118 S. E. 2d 175 (1961).
9. 236 S. 0. 207, 113 S. E. 2d 540 (1960).
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that photographs of the home of the prosecutrix were inad-
missible. The Court concluded there was nothing in any of
them which was calculated to inflame or arouse the sympathy
or prejudice of the jury.
Admissibility of Complaint of Female
In State v. Harrisonl0 the defendants were charged with
rape and convicted of assault and battery of a high and ag-
gravated nature. The court permitted the mother of the
prosecutrix to relate the details of the complaint made by
her daughter when she arrived at the home of a friend less
than two hours after the assault. The defendants objected,
but on appeal the Supreme Court sustained the trial judge
saying, "It is well settled that the fact that the prosecutrix
complained of a rape may be shown in corroboration of her
testimony." The Court went on to say, "The particulars or
details are not admissible but so much of the complaint as
identified 'the time and place with that of the one charged'
may be shown."
Inquiring into Voluntariness of Confession
Further objection was had to the trial judge's conducting
the preliminary inquiry as to the voluntariness of a confession
in the presence of the jury. The Supreme Court, while con-
cluding that the better practice would be to conduct this
preliminary examination in the absence of the jury, concluded
that where the confession was found to: be admissible the
failure to conduct the preliminary examination in the absence
of the jury would not be- a reversible error.
Election Between Reckless Homicide and Involuntary
Manslaughter
In eState v. Cavers" the defendant was prosecuted for
homicide as the result of a fatal traffic accident at an inter-
section in the city of York. From a conviction of reckless
homicide, the defendant appealed on the ground, inter alia,
that the State should have been required to elect between reck-
less homicide and involuntary manslaughter. The Court sus-
tained the trial judge's action in not requiring an election and
charging involuntary manslaughter even though the defend-
ant had not been specifically indicted for it. "The State can-
not be required to elect between counts in an indictment when
10. 236 S. C. 246, 113 S. E. 2d 783 (1960).
11. 236 S. C. 305, 114 S. E. 2d 401 (1960).
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they charge offenses of the same character and refer to the
same transaction, whether or not one charge is a common law
offense and another statutory offense."
Contributory Negligence as a Defense to Reckless Homicide
Appellant raised a second question asserting that the only
reasonable inference from the evidence was that decedent's
negligence and recklessness was the sole proximate cause of
the collision. The Court disagreed with this contention and as-
serted that even if decedent had been contributorily negligent
such negligence would not be a defense in a case such as this.
The Court said, "It is sufficient to convict if defendant's
recklessness is a contributing proximate cause."
Evidence of Willingness to Take Polygraph Test
The only murder case to be reviewed by the Supreme Court
was State v. Britt.12 Following the conviction of murder, the
defendants appealed alleging numerous specifications of error.
One defendant wanted to introduce evidence of his willingness
to take a lie detector test and argued that had he been tried
separately he could offer such testimoney. The Court over-
ruled this objection and stated, "It is our opinion that evi-
dence of the willingness of the appellant, Westbury, to take
a lie detector test was inadmissible whether tried jointly with
-the appellant, Britt, or separately." The Court quoted several
cases holding in effect that evidence of a lie detector test is
not admissible and neither is evidence of professed willing-
ness or refusal to submit to such test.
Separate Trials for Jointly Indicted Defen&nts
The defendant, Westbury, asserted that error was com-
mitted by the failure of the trial judge to order separate
trials. He contended that upon a separate trial he could im-
peach the testimony of Britt by showing previous convictions
and that in a separate trial the confession of Britt would not
be admissible against Westbury. He also asserted that upon
a separate trial he could show that he was over-persuaded
and dominated by Britt. The Court overruled all these objec-
ti6ns holding that a trial together was proper and it con-
cluded that Britt's testimony could be impeached at this trial
should it be offered and that in the instant trial the confes-
12. 287 S. C. 293, 117 S. E. 2d 879 (1960).
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sion of Britt would not be admissible against Westbury. The
Court further concluded that if Britt had over-persuaded and
attempted to dominate Westbury there was no reason in the
instant trial why Westbury could not have tendered such
evidence.
Voir Dire
The defendant, Britt, contended that he was entitled to a
new trial because the trial judge erred in refusing him the
right of cross examination of the jurors on their voir dire.
The Court disposed of this contention by stating:
The record shows that the trial Judge sufficiently ex-
amined the jurors to determine whether they were in-
different in the cause. This is a question of fact for-
determination by the trial Judge and is not reviewable.
in this Court unless it should appear that his conclusion
is wholly without evidence to support it. State v. Fuller,
229 S. C. 439, 93 S. E. (2d) 463.
The trial judge in this case did, with meticulous care, examine
each and every prospective juror and presented them only-
when found to be fully qualified and indifferent.
Numerous other exceptions were urged upon the Court as
grounds for a new trial. None of these exceptions invited
any new principles of law and all were overruled by the Court.
Change of Venue
State v. Graham1 3 was a prosecution for wilfully and fe-
loniously setting fire to a hotel with the intent of defrauding
insurance companies. From a judgment of conviction, the de-
fendant appealed, alleging insufficiency of evidence to con-
vict and alleging that under any circumstances the place of
trial should be changed from the county where the crime
occurred to an adjoining county on the ground that an im-
partial jury could not be obtained.
The Court held that the evidence was sufficient for the jury
to pass upon it and that the conviction of the defendant by
the jury would not be disturbed by the Supreme Court. The
Court concluded that the motion for change of venue on the,
ground that an impartial jury could not be obtained was ad-
dressed to the discretion of the trial judge and no abuse of
discretion had been shown.
13. 237 S. C. 278, 117 S. E. 2d 147 (1960).
1961]
9
Rogers: Criminal Law and Procedure
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
Habeas Corpus
Kelly v. Manning,14 was a habeas corpus proceeding. Ap-
pellant, an inmate of the State Penitentiary serving two life
sentences, contended that at the time of his plea of guilty he
was drunk and by reason thereof he should be granted a new
trial. The facts showed that if he were drunk he was vol-
untarily so. The Court disposed of this contention with the
following:
No appeal was taken from his sentence; no motion for
new trial was made; and more than ten years lapsed
before the petitions now under review were filed in his
behalf. If in fact he was drunk when he entered his
plea, he has shown no excuse for his failure to make
that contention known before now.
14. 237 S. C. 364, 117 S. E. 2d 362 (1960).
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